How has China influenced Korea?

The Korean War

Table of Contents:

1 Introduction

2. An overview of the conflicting parties

3. The Background to the Korean War
3.1. Historical background up to the partition of Korea
3.2. The emergence of South Korea
3.3. The making of North Korea
3.4. Historical overview from the division to the start of the war
3.5. How the Korean War came about
3.6. Overview map

4. Course of the conflict

5. The consequences of the war
5.1. The consequences of the war - in general
5.2. The Consequences of the War for Korea
5.3. The consequences of the war for China
5.4. The consequences of the war for the USA
5.5. The consequences of the war for the Soviet Union
5.6. The consequences of the war for Japan
5.7. The consequences of the war for the Federal Republic of Germany

6. Developments after 1953

7. Conclusion

8. Bibliography
8.1. Primary literature
8.2. Secondary literature
8.3. Sources from the internet

9. Glossary of Chinese Names

1 Introduction

In my opinion, the Korean War is particularly interesting because it is considered the first military outbreak of the East-West conflict and the only hot phase of the “Cold War”. At that time the United Nations intervened for the first time in its - at that time still young - history through the deployment of troops in a war, even if the majority of the soldiers deployed came from America, because the policy of the UN was still strong at that time influenced by the USA and its structures at that time cannot be compared with today's. The parallels that can be drawn between the division of Korea and that of Germany are interesting, because Germany, like Korea, was divided by an agreement between the victorious powers. In contrast to Germany, which was reunified after forty years, this has not happened in Korea to this day, even if Peter Opitz published in 1988 the "Report of the Federal Institute for East Scientific and International Studies: The Korean Peninsula in the Field of Tension between the Asia-Pacific Powers "Was still of the opinion that the reunification of Korea seems more likely than that of Germany:

“While it is questionable whether the governments in Seoul and Pyongyang will be able to achieve the level of cooperation in the foreseeable future that the two German states have been able to achieve since the early 1970s, the different international constellations are likely to last in the long term seen the chances for a reunification of the two parts of the country to be greater than in Germany. ”(Opitz 1988: 2).

The Korean War is often described as a single stage in a far-reaching conflict between the great powers over control of the Korean peninsula, because Korea has always been in the field of tension between the powers due to its geographical location. In my opinion, it is also worth mentioning that even China, which initially held back despite its reputation as the “protective power of Korea”, was inevitably drawn into this war at a time when China was “[...] anything but foreign War. ”(Janssen 1976: 192).

At first I assumed that the historical facts of this conflict have now been fully clarified. However, as I looked more closely at the literature on this subject, I often found different statements and widely differing theories. Most of the differences can be explained by the fact that the authors look at events from different points of view. However, some events are still controversial today: "The motives of the individual actors have not yet been fully clarified." (Osterhammel 1989: 360).

In the following work I will first go into more detail on the conflicting parties and then explain the historical background, especially the emergence of North and South Korea. Then I show various theories mentioned in the literature about the origins of the Korean War. In addition to the course of the war, I describe the consequences that the conflict in Korea had for the countries involved, as well as the development of the different social systems in the two Korean states and the processes in connection with this war to this day. I will also pay particular attention to the current state of relations between the various states and the role of China in these events.

2. An overview of the conflicting parties

The parties to the conflict on the side of the “Democratic People's Republic of North Korea” with the capital Pyongyang, which was currently ruled by the communist-oriented Kim Ilsong, included the Soviet Union under Yossif W. Stalin, which only provided indirect aid through arms deliveries and military advisers the People's Republic of China under Máo Zédōng supported North Korea from November 25th, 1950 with "Voluntary Associations of the Chinese People" ("Zhōngguó Rénmín Zhìyuànjūn") (Weggel 1989: 167). On the other hand, the west-oriented “Republic of Korea in the South” with the capital Seoul, in which the anti-communist Syngman Rhee was head of state, the USA fought under its President Harry S. Truman, and from 1953 under Dwight David Eisenhower. The American General Douglas MacArthur was appointed as "Commander in Chief Far East" and commander of the UN troops in Korea, who was replaced by General Matthew Ridgeway from 1952 onwards. In addition, the troops of another 15 member states of the UN from Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Greece, Turkey, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Ethiopia, stood on America's side, albeit in small numbers Philippines, Thailand and Colombia.

3. The Background to the Korean War

3.1. The historical background to the division of Korea

For a long time, Korea had repeatedly fallen victim to its strategically favorable location and thus become the plaything of the great powers. China and Japan played a major role: "Located on the easternmost tip of the Asian continent, the peninsula offered itself as a springboard for the conquest of Japan by continental powers or, conversely, the Asian continent by Japan." (Opitz 1988: 6) . It began as early as the 1st century BC with attacks by the Japanese and Chinese armies on Korea. Equestrian tribes such as the Mongols, the Jurds and the Liao also tried again and again to conquer parts of Korea. In 1388, a Korean general freed his people from the vassal status imposed on them by the Mongols in 1259 and founded the Yi dynasty, which would last until 1910. In 1274, Kublai Khan tried from Korea to conquer Japan with a fleet built by Koreans, but failed. In return, the Japanese Hideyoshi Toyomi attempted to invade East Asia via Korea in 1592, devastating large parts of Korea. The rulers of China at the time, who belonged to the Ming dynasty (Míngcháo), came to Korea's aid because they viewed the peninsula as a “gateway to China” (Janssen 1976: 193). They also acted in their own interests, because Korea was considered a “tributary state” of China (Opitz 1988: 5). The Middle Kingdom felt responsible for Korea and both states were of the opinion that they "[...] acted as a family and are in the relationship of father and son or ruler and subject to one another." (Opitz 1988: 5 Quoted from: Nelson, Frederick M. Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia. 1945. repr. New York 1967: p. 76). In 1627 Korea was again degraded to a vassal state, this time by the Manchus, who had great difficulty protecting the peninsula from being conquered by Japan or the European imperial powers. (Opitz 1988: 5). In 1644 the Qing dynasty replaced the Ming dynasty (Qīngcháo) in China and placed Korea under Chinese control. After Japan forced the opening of three Korean ports in the Treaty of Kanghwa in 1876 and the Soviet Union also expanded its national territory more and more, China urged Korea to move closer to the Americans. In 1882 there was a treaty between the USA and the Korean peninsula, in which the United States assured Korea that it would support third parties. This was part of China's indirect strategy of playing the powers off against one another in order to prevent a conquest of Korea.

The Sino-Japanese War took place in 1894 and 1895, in which the two states fought for supremacy in Korea. China originally wanted to push back the Japanese in this war and secure its own position on the peninsula, but since Japan won, the Middle Kingdom was forced to recognize Korea's independence in the Peace of Shimonoseki (Opitz 1988: 6). Not long afterwards, the Japanese also won the Russo-Japanese War and the Soviet Union had to recognize Korea as a Japanese area of ​​interest in the Peace of Portsmouth in 1905. Great Britain and the US did not intervene in either conflict, although the 1882 treaty between the US and Korea was still in force. The victory of Japan seemed to them to be the lesser of two evils because of the already enormous expansion of Russia. In addition, both Great Britain and the USA had signed a treaty with Japan and the USA had been promised hegemony over the Philippines in return for the Japanese annexation of Korea (Opitz 1988: 6). Korea became the Japanese General Government on August 22, 1910 and remained so until the Japanese were expelled in 1945. The Korean emperor had to abdicate and a brutal colonial rule began with the aim of eradicating Korean culture: the Koreans were oppressed, they were denied all political rights and the country was economically exploited (Opitz 1988: 7). After another war between Japan and China in 1937, a Korean government-in-exile began to develop in Chóngqìng, China, under the right-wing Kim Ku, but it was never recognized diplomatically. No further attention was paid to the fact that the government in exile declared war on Japan on December 9, 1941 (Hielscher 1988: 280). After Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941, the exploitation of Korea intensified and from then on the population had to do forced labor in military service and in the armaments industry (Opitz 1988: 7). During the Second World War, Korea could by no means be counted among the enemy states of the Allies, as it was itself a victim of Japanese colonial policy. Despite this, Korean freedom was not restored after the war ended. Instead, Roosevelt, Churchill and Jiăng Jièshí (Chiang Kaishek) decided at the Cairo Conference in December 1943 that Korea "[...] in due course free and independent [...]" (Opitz 1988: 7th quotation from: Department of State Bulletin Vol. IX, December 4, 1943 p. 393). At the same time, they agreed to a trust in Korea, the duration of which America initially stated to be 40 years, but then reduced it to 5-25 years at the Conference in Tehan in 1945 (Hielscher 1988: 277). The Koreans knew nothing of these resolutions and when the document finally became known in a translated form in Korea, a huge mistake had crept in, because instead of the freedom and independence “in due time” it was read there “immediately” what the Koreans said naturally enthusiastic (Hielscher 1988: 275). At the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, an international trusteeship over Korea was approved in preparation for later independence, as planned in Cairo. After the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Stalin kept the promise he had made at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 and declared war on Japan. His troops marched into the Japanese-ruled north of Korea and only stopped a few kilometers north of Seoul.

Meanwhile, in Korea, a state preparation committee had been set up under the moderate left, Yo Un Hyong, who tried to build a central government apparatus. In August 1945 the US proposed the temporary partition of Korea at the 38th parallel. Nobody expected, however, that the Soviet Union would accept this maximum demand, because then Seoul would be in the occupied territory of the USA (Hielscher 1988: 278). To the surprise of the Americans, however, the Soviet Union agreed to this plan on August 11, 1945, and Korea was to be occupied and disarmed by the Soviet Union north of this demarcation line and by the USA south of the 38th parallel (Rauchwetter 1986: 64). After Japan officially surrendered on August 14, 1945, the victorious powers gave the order on September 2, 1945 that the Japanese troops had to surrender without exception (Hielscher 1988: 282). They did this to the American soldiers without a fight, but the Soviet army had to enforce the order by force.

On September 6, 1945, Yo Un Hyong convened the People's Representative Congress in Seoul, at which the founding of the People's Republic under a national government for all of Korea was decided (Hielscher 1988: 276). MacArthur's announcement the next day, however, nullified this plan, because in it he emphasized that the USA had all governmental powers south of the 38th parallel and would also exercise this consistently. When US Lieutenant General Hodge arrived in Inchon on September 8, 1945 and refused to receive the delegates from the provisional government of Korea and the American military administration finally declared the Korean government to be inadmissible in December 1945, the Korean people came of age again agreed (Hielscher 1988: 80). This led to a split in the population in which the communists who supported the Soviet Union faced the supporters of the bourgeois party and the nationalists (Hielscher 1988: 285). A conference of foreign ministers was held at the same time, attended by the USA, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. They finally decided on the five-year trusteeship of Korea by America, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China and drew up a plan for the establishment of a “joint commission” to deal with the formation of a provisional government (Opitz 1988: 7). Shortly afterwards, however, this commission failed because of the question of which Korean social forces should participate in the formation of the government. On September 17, 1947, the USA applied for the Korean question to be handed over from the hands of the four trustees to the United Nations, which, however, would have meant a violation of the Moscow Declaration, according to which the United Nations would not be able to answer questions related to the outcome of the second World War have to do, are responsible. Thereupon Moscow proposed the withdrawal of the occupation troops and free elections. The USA rejected this. In November 1947, the international commission proposed that UN elections should take place under its supervision, before the armed forces withdrew. However, at the suggestion of America, these should take place separately in both parts of the country. However, this idea met with resistance from the USSR, since the number of representatives should correspond to the respective proportion of the population, but more than twice as many people lived in the area occupied by the Americans than in the Soviet occupation zone. The USSR denied the commission access to North Korea, which is why free elections were held in Korea in 1948, but separately in both parts of the country (Opitz 1988: 9).

3.2. The making of South Korea

On August 10, 1948, the first general parliamentary elections in South Korea took place under the supervision of the UN, but the electoral law excluded all illiterate people, who at that time made up about half of the population. The leader of the nationalist resistance, Syngman Rhee, who had studied in the USA and was anti-communist, won these elections. Shortly afterwards the constitution was passed and on August 15, 1948 the "Republic of Korea (RK) in the South" was proclaimed. As President Rhee was basically oriented towards the West and also dependent on American economic and military aid. However, he took advantage of his position as head of government to gradually build a dictatorship based on a body made up primarily of large landowners, entrepreneurs and collaborators during the occupation. It is also said that the opposition was persecuted in the run-up to the elections, for example there were 589 political murders in the 6 weeks before the election. The UN observers were therefore of the opinion that the vote would not express the will of the people and they sanctioned it. Under Rhee's regime there were frequent coup attempts, mutinies in the army and unrest among the population. In 1949, the UN commission even interrupted its work to protest against the government's terrorist methods. In the same year, under pressure from the American Congress, all of the US occupation soldiers except for a few small advisory troops left South Korea, although Rhee implored them to stay and help him put down the peasant uprisings that had once again emerged.In February 1950, South Korea applied for membership in the UN, but this was rejected by a Soviet veto. Shortly thereafter, parliamentary elections were held again in South Korea, which Rhee had tried in vain to prevent. The result was a crushing defeat for Rhees, who refused to resign.

3.3. The making of North Korea

The system of communist people's committees that had existed in the north since 1945 was taken over under the Soviet occupation. On October 10, 1945, the North Korean Communist Party was founded with Kim Ilsong as chairman, and a provisional government with a provisional people's committee, also chaired by Kim Ilsong, was established (Hielscher 1988: 283). The first elections were held in North Korea on August 25, 1948 and on September 9, 1948 the “Korean Democratic People's Republic (DPRK) in the north” was proclaimed by the Communist Korean Workers' Party (KAP) under the auspices of the Soviet occupying power (Rauchwetter 1986: 64 ). During this time, more than 250,000 Koreans in exile returned to North Korea from the USSR. In December 1948, the Soviet Union evacuated North Korea, but left behind large parts of its troops and weapons. Two years later, North Korea applied for membership in the UN, but this was rejected by the Western powers.

3.4. Historical overview from the division to the start of the war

Both the USA and the Soviet Union wanted to secure supremacy in Asia and expand their sphere of influence. The Korean War can therefore also be viewed as a conflict between the two great powers and their ideologies on Korean soil. The Soviet Union had recognized the geostrategic importance of Korea and sensed its great opportunity to incorporate Korea into the Soviet sphere of influence. She had long since registered her claim to Korea, but had been put in her place by the lost war against Japan in 1904/1905. After the Second World War, she made another attempt. In addition to the collapse of the anti-Hitler coalition and the East-West conflict, the defeat of the Chinese national government and the Communists' seizure of power in China in 1949 made a position on the Korean peninsula even more important for the USSR. But for America, too, a pillar in Korea was almost indispensable for the control of the events in the Far East, which the USA did not recognize immediately, because on January 12, 1950 the US Secretary of State still described Korea as “outside the Asian defense system”. Parameters ”after Truman had made the following statement shortly before in relation to the civil war between China and Taiwan:

“The United States has no predatory intentions against Formosa (Taiwan) or any other Chinese territory. The United States currently has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa, nor does it intend to use its armed forces to intervene in the current situation. The United States government will not steer any course that might lead to its involvement in the civil war with China. Neither will the United States government provide military advice or assistance to the Chinese armed forces on Formosa. The United States government believes that Formosa has sufficient resources to provide these armed forces with the means they need to defend the island ”(Spence 1995: 625).

The official statement that was to be made after the communists conquered Taiwan had also been drafted. This turned out to be America's political mistake because the US had misjudged the situation and did not at the time believe that communism could become a threat to Western systems. America set its priorities in Europe and left Asia more or less to chance. Less than three months later, however, the NSC 68 document of the National Security Council was passed, in which the Soviet Union and China were described as a “monolithic, communist bloc”, “[...] which aimed to undermine hitherto non-communist peripheral states . ”(Osterhammel 1989: 361). American policy of containment was militarized and the expansion of communism was to be countered from now on with direct military action. For this reason, Korea was declared a “vital interest” worthy of protection and a “front-line state in the global military containment line” in June 1950 (Osterhammel 1989: 361). After the victory of the communists, China was actually busy with reforms in its own country and was not at all prepared for a war. There was even a partial demobilization of the armed forces in order to have more workers available for production and agriculture.

3.5. How the Korean War came about

There are various theories about the events that ultimately led to the Korean War, none of which have been fully proven to date. One of these speculations assumes that Syngman Rhee provoked North Korea so that the US could intervene and bring Korea under its rule from the south. A second theory is that Kim Ilsong wanted to overthrow the Syngman Rhee regime and thereby bring about the unification of the country. The risks would not have been very great, since North Korea was superior to the South and, according to Truman's declaration, North Korea was not in the area of ​​interest of the USA. In addition, there was growing opposition to President Syngman Rhee in South Korea, which may have convinced the head of state of North Korea that the South Koreans wanted him as a liberator to overthrow the Rhees government and reunite Korea (Microsoft Encarta 1999). According to this theory, Máo and Stalin would have been privy to the plans and agreed. The attack by North Korea could also have been planned from Moscow and North Korea and China could have acted on behalf of Stalin. Stalin would have had good reasons to employ the US in Asia to make room for the Soviet Union in Europe and to avoid the US concentrating its forces on one point. Dean Achson's statement, in which he said that South Korea was outside the American defense belt, could also have triggered the Korean War and acted like an invitation to North Korea to invade South Korea, because North Korea had legitimate hopes for one make a successful foray into South Korea (Rauchwetter 1986: 64). The last theory, which seems most likely on the basis of documents recently discovered in Russia, assumes that a first meeting between Kim Ilsong and Stalin took place in March 1949, at which Kim Stalin announced his intention to unite Korea. Stalin is said to have promised indirect support to Korea, but no military aid, as he feared a renewed world war between the USSR and the USA. He is said to have referred to the Chinese for direct support, with the aim of isolating China from the West and making it dependent on Moscow. But initially, Máo also feared a confrontation with the USA and therefore originally did not want to interfere in the war. As a result, Kim Ilsong allegedly spread fake news of an impending attack by South Korea. The events that took place in Europe in 1950, including the Berlin crisis, distracted Americans from Korea. In the end, Máo held out a possible intervention at a later date, as he expected that the Americans, as announced in the Truman Declaration, would no longer intervene in conflicts on the Asian continent. North Korea worked with the USSR and China to lay the foundations for South Korean intervention and reached an agreement with China that if the Americans attacked, China would help North Korea. Stalin, on the other hand, gave tactical war advice, delivered weapons and sent Soviet military advisers to North Korea. At that time, China felt lured into a trap by the Soviet Union, which would at the same time explain the later alienation between China and the USSR (

3.6. Overview map

from: Twichett, Denis, and John K. Fairbank. The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 14. Cambridge University Press 1987. Reprinted 1989. 273.

4. The course of the conflict

On June 25, 1950 at 4 a.m., North Korean troops attacked South Korea and crossed the 38th parallel without having previously made a declaration of war. Since gang wars had repeatedly taken place on the demarcation line, the attack was not immediately recognized as such, which increased the surprise effect. At that time, the South Korean army consisted of around 94,000 lightly armed soldiers, while North Korea went to war with over 200,000 men armed with weapons supplied by the Soviet Union and also owned numerous Soviet tanks. Because of this superiority, the South Korean army had no choice but to withdraw, which allowed the North Koreans to advance rapidly: three days after the attack, the North Korean army was already threatening the capital of South Korea, Seoul.

The North Korean attack came as a complete surprise to America, which was distracted by events in Europe. In addition, the commander in chief of the American troops in Japan, Douglas MacArthur, had deliberately withheld information about the armament of the North Koreans because he wanted to provoke a conflict between the United States and the communists and thereby become president. He saw the victory over the communists as a guarantee for his election as head of state. He therefore played down the situation in North Korea in order to weaken the president's credibility and keep American politicians out of Korea who could have found a diplomatic solution. He even threatened China with sanctions that America had never discussed. Another reason why America felt so taken by surprise by the North Korean attack was that the US did not expect a war from the Soviet Union or its allies before 1954 and was even more prepared not to a positional war on land, but to a nuclear war . It was problematic for America to intervene in this war, as it had no allies in Asia at that time. The peace treaty with Japan was only signed in 1951. Because of this, and because of the declarations made by America at the beginning of 1950, North Korea and the Soviet Union did not expect the following violent reaction from the USA at all (Hielscher 1988: 315). As soon as they heard of the North Korean attack, they began to mobilize their troops and called on the UN to take further measures, because “[...] in 1950, as in the case of West Berlin, they were unable to allow their personal protégé South Korea to become part of the communist empire - fall. "(Halle 1967: 211). At the urging of the USA, the United Nations issued a request to North Korea to withdraw, which the North Korean troops, however, ignored. Instead, they kept advancing.

On June 26th, 1950 the American President Harry S. Truman ordered the deployment of air and naval forces in support of South Korea. At a meeting of the UN Security Council, sanctions against North Korea in the form of UN armed forces were decided upon in response to a resolution tabled by the USA. This meeting took place without the representatives of the Soviet Union, as the USSR was boycotting the UN Security Council at the time because of its refusal to accept China as a member instead of Taiwan. Since there was no threat of a veto by the USSR, the other members acted quickly and decided to give South Korea "[...] the necessary assistance [...]" (Spence 1995: 625). The supreme command of the UN troops was transferred to the USA, the supreme command went to General Douglas MacArthur, to whom Syngman Rhee placed the South Korean army shortly afterwards. At the same time, Truman ordered the 7th US fleet into the Taiwan Strait to “defuse the situation” and fearing that China might seize the moment and attack Taiwan. This made it impossible for China to invade Taiwan. China's Foreign Minister Zhōu Ēnlái perceived this act as "[...] armed aggression against Chinese territory [...]" (Spence 1995: 627). The well-known Chinese newspaper Rénmín Rìbào wrote: “The US imperialism occupied our sacred territory, the province of Taiwan, by force of arms” (Janssen 1976: 192). However, since the Allied troops were hardly battle-tested and the Korean terrain was completely alien to them, North Korea was able to conquer the south almost completely by September 1950, despite the quick measures taken, and finally controlled the entire country up to 100 km2 around the port city of Pusan. There the troops of the UN and South Korea stopped the advance of the North Korean army for the first time by building a defensive ring around Pusan, thus making the conquest impossible. At the same time, the Allies planned an invasion of Inchon, which took place on September 14, 1950. They had chosen a spot on the South Korean coast, the location of which seemed extremely unfavorable for a landing, in order to surprise the North Korean troops. The country could only be reached there by boats at high tide, which for the soldiers meant that people and material had to be unloaded within 2.5 hours. This maneuver turned out to be a complete success, because from Inchon the UN troops succeeded in breaking the North Korean lines and by breaking out of Pusan ​​at the same time, they caught the North Koreans and cut off their retreat ( Spence, 1995: 627). This deprived the North Korean army of any course of action. Within a month she had almost completely dispersed and on September 26th. Seoul was in the hands of the UN and South Korea. This would have ended the Korean War had it not been for General Douglas MacArthur, who saw his chance for a presidency only in a victory over the communists, in this case over China, and therefore abandoned the previous "containment policy" ( Containment) went over to the attack, the so-called "roll back" (Hielscher 1988: 317).

On October 7, 1950, the UN forces crossed the 38th parallel, despite warnings from China, which saw the arrival of the Americans in North Korea as a border threat and saw it as a reason to intervene in the war: China had already blocked the Taiwan Strait as a aggressive act damned and not intervened. The penetration of the Allied troops into North Korea could not be accepted, however, because the North Korean buffer would be lost. Truman spoke out against moving troops into North Korea because he wanted to avoid the conflict with China, but MacArthur argued as follows:

“[...] the Chinese would by no means dare to intervene in the fighting - if they really didn't, they would have lost face, if communism had suffered a humiliating defeat, if they did, they could to bring the war into China with united forces and to revise the verdict of history from the year 1949. ”(Janssen 1976: 193), whereupon Truman gave his consent. On October 19, the North Korean capital Pyongyang was captured and finally the UN troops moved towards the Yālù Jiāng, the border river with China, and the air force bombed power plants on Chinese territory. Since Mao's intervention order in early October, Chinese soldiers had invaded North Korea unnoticed in small troops and had begun to support the North Korean soldiers. On November 25th China then launched a surprising general attack, which initially involved more than 250,000 and later up to 700,000 “people's volunteers” (Weggel 1989: 167). This attack forced MacArthur to withdraw his troops. However, America then submitted a motion to the UN to designate China as an aggressor, which prevented China from becoming a member of the United Nations for the next 20 years (Janssen 1976: 193). The Chinese troops were superior because of their party tactics, in which they only moved at night and left almost no traces. They repeatedly carried out brief attacks and their spies kept them informed of the plans of the American troops. A state of emergency was declared in the USA at this time and all troops were mobilized. There were also discussions about the use of atomic bombs. A peaceful solution to the Korean War was first considered in November, and in December 1950 representatives of the United Nations proposed a solution to the conflict through cooperation between the USA, Great Britain, China and the USSR.A meeting never came about, however, as Máo demanded an agreement on Taiwan's affiliation with China and China's admission to the United Nations (Hielscher 1988: 319).

Meanwhile, the propaganda campaign "Resistance against the USA, Help for Korea" (kàng Mĕi yuán Cháo (băo jiā wèi guó)) took place in China, in which the Chinese donated to support North Korea and whose motto was:

“The barbaric actions of American imperialism and its followers in the invasion of Korea not only endanger peace in Asia and around the world, but also pose a serious threat to the security of China in particular. North Korea's friends are our friends. North Korea's enemy is our enemy. North Korea's defense is our defense ”(Spence 1995: 627).

Mao's speech also took place at that time: "The Chinese people's volunteers must protect every mountain, every river, every tree and every blade of grass." In it he said:

“The Chinese comrades must form the closest fraternities with the Korean comrades, share joy and sorrow with them, stand with them in life and death and fight until the common enemy is finally defeated. The Chinese comrades must regard the cause of Korea as their own, and all commanders and fighters must be trained to protect every mountain, river, tree and blade of grass in Korea and the Korean people not a single needle and not to take a thread away - so their attitude and behavior must be the same as in their own country. That is the political basis for victory. If we do so, we are sure of final victory ”(Mao 1978: 44).

Meanwhile, the fighting in Korea continued: In January 1951, the troops of North Korea and China again took Seoul, but were stopped shortly afterwards and two months later Seoul was again under the influence of UN troops. The war degenerated more and more into a struggle of the masses on the Chinese side against machines on the side of the Allies. As a result of the grueling positional wars, both arms suffered heavy losses. After a year, the war finally leveled off at the demarcation line, which marked the beginning of two years of bitter positional struggle (Janssen 1976: 194). At this time, Truman began to seek further diplomatic solutions, which MacArthur countered by continuing to provoke China to prevent a peaceful solution to the Korean conflict. He wanted the atomic bombing of China and the use of Chinese national troops from Taiwan against the communists to decide the war for the USA (Janssen 1976: 194). Thereupon President Truman withdrew his high command in April 1951, because Truman did not want to risk another world war because of the Korean conflict. General Matthew Ridgeway took over from MacArthur as the new commander in chief of the troops. The first armistice treaty was drawn up in May 1951 and the armistice negotiations began on July 10, 1951 in Kaesong, North Korea (Hielscher 1988: 320f.), Although they were not to be successful until two years later. The main problem in the negotiations was the armistice line and the prisoners of war, whose return to their home countries was demanded by the communists, while the UN was of the opinion that this decision should be left to the prisoners (Hielscher 1988: 321). On July 27, 1953, shortly after Stalin's death, the armistice agreements were signed by all parties involved, only South Korea refused to sign (Hielscher 1988: 321). This success can also be traced back to the replacement of Truman as President of the USA by Eisenhower, who did not keep his campaign promise to travel to Korea himself, but who was nevertheless very committed to the conclusion of the ceasefire agreement by “[ ...] used the full diplomatic weight of the atomic power America [...] ”(Spence 1995: 629). The Panmunjom Agreement contained the following points, among others: The fire should be stopped immediately. The 38th parallel was chosen as the armistice line, which was to mark the border between North and South Korea, surrounded by a 4 km wide demilitarized zone. In addition to holding a conference on the Korean question, it was also decided to set up a “repatriation commission” to monitor the exchange of prisoners. The armistice line at the 38th parallel is still one of the most fortified and “hottest” borders in the world. (Opitz 1988: 11).

5. The consequences of the war

5.1. The consequences of the war - in general

For this war, in which there were no winners and at the end of which the starting position was largely restored, great losses, both in material and in people, were accepted on all sides. The data on fatalities in the literature fluctuate a lot, so the following figures are only intended to give a rough overview of the dimensions. In addition to several million civilians, the Korean War is said to have cost the lives of more than 400,000 soldiers on the South Korean side. The US casualties are estimated at over 160,000 and in North Korea the number of dead is estimated at around 600,000 soldiers. In China, 700,000 to 900,000 of the “people's volunteers” are said to have not survived the war. However, this figure was never published in China because, according to the Chinese government, "[...] they consisted of" volunteers "and not regular troops [...]" (Spence 1995: 629).

5.2. The Consequences of the War for Korea

All the countries involved had lost in this war, but Korea was particularly hard hit. In addition to the high losses of people and material and the not inconsiderable war costs, large parts of the country had been destroyed by the American air force and a large part of the industrial facilities had been rendered inoperable, even though there had been hardly any changes in the political or military situation before 1950 . Both parts of Korea had to take out large loans from other countries to rebuild their country and are therefore still heavily indebted today. Preliminary talks for the conference on the peaceful unification of the country, which was stipulated in the Panmunjom ceasefire agreement, failed in December 1953. Apart from the ceasefire agreement, there is therefore no binding treaty and on the demarcation line, despite the control commission set up there, compliance is enforced the agreement is supposed to monitor incidents again and again. Korea has remained a hotspot and the prospect of reunification has not yet taken place.

5.3. The consequences of the war for China

In this war, despite all its losses, China had “demonstrated its efficiency as a military power that did not allow itself to be provoked with impunity and knew how to defend its borders” (Osterhammel 1989: 362). Through the intervention of China, the United Nations army had been repulsed, China had "fought against the strongest people in the world and won". This gave rise in China to a previously unheard-of national pride and admiration for the newly elected communist regime that had made this victory possible in the eyes of the Chinese. This strengthened party rule and completely destroyed the last hope for the early establishment of a democracy. In this war, China was by no means the aggressor the USA portrayed it as, because China was actually not at all prepared for a war, it was itself still suffering from the consequences of the civil war between the communists and the Gu- ómíndăng. The Chinese would never have attacked on their own in this situation, because the “people's volunteers” who were ultimately sent to fight in Korea were nothing more than soldiers returning from the civil war who were used as farmers and workers to rebuild the country. In addition, the new communist system could not carry out many of the necessary reforms, as the high war costs had to be paid with the money it needed. The Chinese did not attack immediately when they felt threatened, but only when they saw no other way out: the relocation of the 7th Fleet to the Taiwan Strait was condemned by the Chinese because it meant their plans to conquer the The island was destroyed, but military intervention in the war only took place after the American troops invaded the Chinese defense buffer of North Korea despite multiple, almost pleading warnings, and China was also confronted with a nuclear war for the first time. Then the Chinese rulers had no choice but to intervene, also at the risk of shattering hopes for admission to the UN, for better relations with Washington and recognition by the USA (Janssen 1976: 192f.).

After the end of the Korean War, there was a veritable flood of literary works, films and plays. There are numerous stories about exemplary heroes that confirm the myth of Chinese perseverance and to whom values ​​such as self-sacrifice and revolutionary sentiment are usually very important. However, there are hardly any objective reports on the Korean War in Chinese literature, because the historical works that exist are all written very one-sidedly, conceal the losses on the part of China and Korea and portray these two powers as absolute victors. which the US will be forced to sign the armistice treaty. The end of the Korean War is often described as China's moral victory over American imperialism, the paper tiger (“American imperialism is a paper tiger” - “Mĕi dìguózhŭyì shì zhĭ lăohŭ (Máo 1978: 169f.)):

“In the eyes of Asia, the military stalemate turned into a grandiose victory of the coloreds over the whites. For the first time an American general had had to sign an armistice in a war from which the United States did not emerge victorious ”(Janssen 1976: 194).

In 2000, China celebrated the 50th anniversary of entering the Korean War, while Mao and his regime were glorified and their victory over the world power USA was praised. In addition, the friendship with North Korea was sealed again (

Máo's eldest son is especially venerated, who in the eyes of many Chinese died a “heroic death” when he fell victim to an American air raid in Korea (Spence 1995: 629).

In Máo's speeches, only the positive aspects of the Korean War came into play. As the most important points, he named the successful securing of North Korean territory, the military experience that China gained in the fight with the USA, the increase in the political consciousness of the Chinese people and the postponement of the Third World War through a victory by China (Mao 1978: 127ff. ). In addition, China's rule over Tibet was restored in the shadow of the war in October 1950. There were protests, but the Western powers were distracted by the Korean War. On September 12, 1953, Mao gave the speech "The great victory in the war of resistance against US aggression and aid for Korea and our next tasks":

“After three years we have won a great victory in the war of resisting US aggression and helping Korea. Now this war has come to a standstill. How was this victory possible? You have just said, gentlemen, that it was thanks to the correct guidance. Leadership is one of the factors; nothing can succeed without proper guidance. But we won mainly because our war was a people's war supported by the whole nation, and because the peoples of China and Korea fought shoulder to shoulder. We fought against US imperialism, an enemy whose weapons were many times superior to ours, and yet we were able to defeat it and force consent to a ceasefire. ”[...]“ The imperialist aggressors should keep one thing in mind: The Chinese people are now organized and don't put up with anything. If you are irritated, it will fare badly. ”...“ Are we going to attack others? No, we don't want to attack anyone or anything. But if others attack us, we will fight until the end. The Chinese people maintain: We are for peace, but we are not afraid of war. "[...]" In this war we fought resolutely, seriously, using all our forces. Everything the front in Korea needed was made available to them if it was only available at home ”(Máo 1978: 127ff.).

But the war had far-reaching domestic and foreign policy consequences for China. As a result of its international isolation, China became increasingly dependent on the Soviets, especially when Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan and South Vietnam became American military posts from which China felt threatened (Osterhammel 1989: 362). This dependence on the Soviet Union only ended in the early 1960s when China broke off relations with the Soviet Union.

In China, after the Korean War, the evil of imperialism was emphasized with even greater emphasis. The United States and US imperialism, along with Japanese militarism, were considered the greatest enemy of the People's Republic, and decisive action was taken against the western citizens who remained in China. Many were charged with suspicion of espionage and mass campaigns took place against domestic spies, suspected agents, sympathizers of the Guómíndăng or employees of foreign companies (Opitz 1988: 13). It was also this anti-imperialist stance that would later lead to the Cultural Revolution. In addition, China's economic development was slowed down by the Korean War (Osterhammel 1989: 362). A reunification of China was also unsuccessful, because China had to forego the planned invasion of Taiwan, which is still often talked about with regret to this day.

5.4. The consequences of the Korean War for the USA

The Korean War was the first military operation in US history that they failed to win. Nevertheless, they had achieved their goal and contained communist aggression on behalf of the UN. America had restored its status in the Far East, even with the support of the UN member states and supported by the sympathy of large parts of the world. From now on the United States showed a readiness to become clearly involved in Asia and thereby prevent the advance of communism. The Korean peninsula was included in the American security area and Korea became the "[...] key link in a global strategy to contain international communism [...]" (Opitz 1988: 11). During the Korean War, the cost of living in America rose rapidly due to high military spending. The government therefore increased taxes to curb inflation. In addition, it was precisely during this time that there were real hamster purchases, as a shortage of goods was feared. This boosted the economy, whereupon the number of unemployed fell (

The war on the Korean peninsula really fanned the Cold War and made the population's distrust of communism rise more and more until there was true anti-communist hysteria. As a result, the McCarran laws were passed in the early 1950s, which were supposed to help track down communist activities in the USA and according to which foreigners entering the country were examined for a possible communist past. The war led to a change in the military strategic concepts and military development was accelerated: In October 1952, the USA detonated its first hydrogen bomb. In addition, the Korean War was the first military operation after the United States failed to disarm. Reports of the Korean War created a very distorted image of the Chinese in the United States. They have been described as life-despising communists who, with the “human wave tactics”, would all too gladly give their lives for their country (Weggel 1989: 168). In addition, the Chinese are incapable of formulating their own policy and are therefore mechanically obeying Soviet orders.

5.5. The consequences of the war for the Soviet Union

The US intervention put clear limits on both communism in Asia and the expansion of the USSR. The military development of the Soviet Union was accelerated by the war, similar to that of America, and by 1953 the USSR had also developed its first hydrogen bomb. There was an increased reliance on China, which tried to bind the Soviet Union to itself through treaties, but friction with China also increased, since China had become more self-confident through the “victory” in the Korean War.

5.6.The consequences of the war for Japan

The Korean War led to an intensified rehabilitation of Japan, which also resulted in Japan being included in America's security system in Asia (Opitz 1988: 12). In June 1965 a basic treaty on relations between Japan and Korea was concluded, the result of which was the normalization of relations between the two states (Opitz 1988: 12).

5.7. The consequences of the war for the Federal Republic of Germany

The FRG was the only state that could benefit positively from the war in Korea. Here the war meant that Germany was allowed to rearm itself and its integration into the “bloc of the Western powers” ​​was accelerated (Woyke 1995: 384).

6. Developments after 1953

In contrast to Germany, where reunification took place a few years ago, the Korean question remains unsolved to this day, although talks and negotiations have taken place again and again and since 1953 numerous politicians have set themselves the goal of solving this problem. The first attempt took place in 1954 at a conference in Geneva, which began with the American politician Dulles refusing to shake Zhōu Ēnlái's hand to express his antipathy (Osterhammel 1989: 362). This meeting ended as uncompromisingly as it had started, namely without results (Hielscher 1988: 328).

Kim Ilsong had already consolidated his power in North Korea during the Korean War. Although he was still dependent on Moscow and Beijing, he played the two powers off against each other and used them for his goals (Opitz 1988: 12).

In contrast, Syngman Rhee in the south of the peninsula was forced to resign in 1960 by his dissatisfied people and Yun Po Sun took his place. However, he was not to hold the post of head of government for long, as a year later he was overthrown by a military coup and Park Chung Hee, who ruled as an overpowering autocrat for the next 20 years, took over the leadership of South Korea.

In July 1961 treaties of "friendship, cooperation and assistance" were signed between North Korea, China and the Soviet Union. These treaties are special because to date it is the only contractually concluded defense obligation that China has entered into (Opitz 1988: 13). At that time, North Korea was caught in the tension between the two powers, but tended more towards China, from which it had been reliably supported in the war. Nevertheless, Khrushchev tried again and again in vain to force North Korea to his side (Opitz 1988: 13). Relations between the North and the Soviet Union only improved in 1964, after the fall of Khrushchev (Opitz 1988: 13). North Korea soon took advantage of this improvement in relations to receive arms supplies from Moscow. However, the Soviet Union did not let any of its new developments fall into the hands of North Korea. “It seems to be a sensible policy of the Soviet Union to prevent North Korea from building up a military potential large enough to induce an independent attack.” (Opitz 1988: 14, quoted from Arnold Horelik, Soviet Policy Dilemma in Asia, RAND P 5774, December 1976, 13). From 1966 onwards, relations between North Korea and China deteriorated, because in the cultural revolution that broke out there, Kim Ilsong was despised as a “fat revisionist” (Opitz 1988: 14). But as early as April 1970, Zhōu Ēnlái's first trip abroad to Pyongyang ensured an improvement in the mood between the two states (Opitz 1988: 15).

In the 1970s and 1980s, there were repeated minor incidents, for example a tunnel was discovered that the North Koreans had dug under the demarcation line and through which numerous soldiers could have reached the south at the same time (Rauchwetter 1986: 72). From 1971 to 1972 bilateral talks between the two parts of Korea took place at irregular intervals, but in which no noteworthy progress was achieved (Opitz 1988: 34), until June 4, 1972, a completely surprising “Joint Declaration by North - and South Korea ”was published, in which both states announced their will for a reunification that should take place independently and peacefully and according to which the countries wanted to build a common national feeling despite the different ideologies, ideals and systems (Cho 1979 : 153). Relations between the countries developed positively until the good mood in October 1972 dissolved as surprisingly and inexplicably as it had emerged: the South Korean president imposed martial law on South Korea and made himself president for life through an amendment to the constitution . As a result, Kim Ilsong had himself confirmed in his office until his death and thus formalized his sole rule more completely than ever before (Cho 1979: 154). This break made reunification a long way off. It was still regarded as the ultimate goal, but neither of the two presidents advocated that it should take place as quickly as possible, because they were both occupied with "[...] putting their own house in order and make fundamental changes inside. ”(Cho 1979: 155, quoted from Sichrovsky, op. cit., p.131). The negotiations of the Red Cross on family reunification, which began in the 1960s and which had been resumed in 1972, as well as the negotiations of the North-South Coordination Committee were also broken off again (Cho 1979: 155). The north blamed Seoul and the laws that existed there for the protection of national security and the fight against communism for the sudden breakdown of the talks, which would have prevented further negotiations (Cho 1979: 155) The South, on the other hand, criticized the personal cult around Kim Ilsong, which was very widespread in North Korea (Cho 1979: 155f.). Despite these tensions, the DPRK advocated joint accession of the two countries to the United Nations in 1973, in contrast to the South, which wanted separate membership (Cho 1979: 156). In one respect they agreed, however, because both wanted “cross-recognition”. The south remained in its alliance with Washington and Tokyo, but at the same time tried to establish a connection with Beijing and Moscow. North Korea, on the side of Beijing and Moscow, tried to be recognized by Tokyo and Washington (Cho 1979: 156f.).

In 1975, during a visit to China, Kim Ilsong demanded that North Korea be recognized as "the only legally sovereign state of the Korean nation" and that any "two-Korea policy" be rejected. China agreed to this, but did not respond to the more aggressive Korean policy called for by Kim, as the Chinese were still hoping for a peaceful solution to the Korean question and therefore tried to influence Kim Ilsong in this regard (Opitz 1988: 16).

In 1974, North Korea wrote to the USA to agree to negotiate a peace treaty between the two Korean states as part of a tripartite conference in which North and South Korea and the USA were to take part. However, this suggestion went unanswered. North Korea repeated this offer in March 1978, but the South refused (Cho 1979: 158). In 1983 the so-called "Rangoon assassination" was carried out, which killed 17 members of a South Korean delegation when an explosive device detonated under an honorary gallery in Rangoon. The president was spared by a happy coincidence (Rauchwetter 1986: 72).

In autumn 1984 the south was hit by a severe flood disaster. When North Korea offered help to the RK in this crisis situation, it accepted. This led to further talks between the two parts of Korea, although not long before the South had rejected a renewed negotiation offer by North Korea with the USA as a third partner. The talks covered, among other things, trade, the Red Cross societies, their family reunification projects and the drafting of a constitution for a reunified Korea. A non-aggression pact and the joint implementation of the Olympic Games were also discussed (Opitz 1988: 35). These negotiations lasted until January 1986, when North Korea broke off the talks allegedly because of the major maneuver “Team Spirit” scheduled for February. However, speculations have also been made as to whether these meetings served Kim Ilsong not only to demonstrate his goodwill (Opitz 1988: 35).

On November 29, 1987 there was an assassination attempt on a South Korean transport plane, in which 115 people were killed and which is attributed to the North Korean secret service. It was probably an act of protest against the hosting of the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul. In the following year the North responded to South Korea's appeal to abandon the boycott and participate with its own team (Opitz 1988: 1).

After further unsuccessful negotiations, North and South Korea established direct economic relations with each other for the first time at the end of 1988. This was followed in 1991 by a phase of relaxation (Fischer Weltalmanach 2001, 475), which was characterized by mutual recognition, the admission of both states to the UN and the 1992 non-aggression and reconciliation pact, from which North Korea, however, closed again in 1993 - resigned (Woyke 1995: 385). In June 1994 Kim Ilsong agreed to take part in a North-South Korean summit meeting, but this did not take place because of his death in July (Fischer Weltalmanach 2001, 475). Over the next few years there were repeated minor and major conflicts between the states. In 1996, North Korea withdrew from the provisions of the 1953 ceasefire agreement and carried out military exercises for 3 days in the demilitarized zone (Fischer Weltalmanach 1997: 383). Despite these incidents, efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Korean conflict continue even in times of crisis, e.g. during the severe famine in Korea that lasted from 1995 to 1997 and during the Asian crisis of 1997/1998. There are also frequent peace talks between the two countries, such as in Geneva in 1997. Due to economic pressure and at the encouragement of China, the North Korean government deviated more and more from the hostile course towards the south, and a policy of détente developed. The two states are still in a state of war, but the first step towards a common future was the “first meeting between the representatives of North and South Korea since the division of the peninsula” (Fischer Weltalmanach 2001, 475) done in June 2000. This summit meeting marks a historic turning point and is intended to mark the beginning of a new era of cooperation and understanding. The four-point agreement signed at this meeting, however, is very general and, in addition to reducing tensions between the two states, concerns family reunification as well as economic and cultural cooperation (Fischer Weltalmanach 2001, 475). However, a concrete solution to the Korean question that would have satisfied all parties has not yet been found. The "cross-recognition", however, seems to be successful, so Madeleine Albright visited the "Korean Democratic People's Republic in the North" on October 23, 2000 as the first high-ranking US government member since the Korean War ( /nach_center_topsto.860254.html).

7. Conclusion

Despite all their efforts, the two Korean states have not yet been able to agree on a peaceful solution to the Korean conflict, although the two great powers China and Moscow, which have always stood between the states, have for some time been concerned with the economic and political development of their country have to and therefore rarely interfere in Korean affairs. However, in spite of the incidents that occur from time to time in Korean territory, the continuing tensions are generally giving way to steady easing. The Chinese Defense Minister said in October 2000 on the subject of the Korean conflict: "China is committed to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and supports the improvement of relations with South Korea and peaceful reunification without foreign interference."

( The summit, which took place last year, is also cause for hope, because even if the two states are officially still in a state of war, one of the topics of the four-point agreement is reconciliation with the ultimate goal of reunification. The two states are granted their own path and their own development, but in the long run the hope of reunification remains, because in 1988 Peter J. Opitz also had no hopes of an early reunification of Germany.

8. Bibliography

8.1. Primary literature

Opitz, Peter J. "The Korean Peninsula in the Field of Tension between the Asia-Pacific Powers."Reports from the Federal Institute for Eastern and International Studies (1988).

Janssen, Karlheinz. The Age of Mao: China's Rise to Superpower. Düsseldorf, Cologne: Eugen Diederichs Verlag, 1976.

Spence, Jonathan D. China's path to modernity. Translated by Gerda Kurz, Siglinde Summerer, Munich, Vienna: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1995.

Hielscher, Gebhard. 38 times Korea. Munich, Zurich: Piper, 1988.

Rauchwetter, Gerhard. South Korea: illustrated book and travel guide. Munich: Süddeutscher Verlag. 1986.

Osterhammel, Jürgen. China and the world society: From the 18th century to our time. Munich: Beck`sche Verlagsbuchhandlung (Oskar Beck), 1989.

Hall, Louis. The Cold War. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1967.

Microsoft Corporation. Microsoft Encarta 99 Encyclopedia. CD-ROM. Microsoft, 1999. Mao Tse-tung. Selected works. Vol. V. Beijing, 1978.

Twichett, Denis, and John K. Fairbank. The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 14. Cambridge University Press, 1987, reprinted 1989.

Cho, M.Y .: "Effects of the US-Chinese rapprochement on Korea."China between world revolution and realpolitik, causes and international consequences of the American-Chinese rapprochement. Ed. Peter J. Opitz. Munich: Verlag Ernst Vögel, 1979. 149-160.

Woyke, Wichard. "Formative conflicts after the Second World War."Manual for International Politics, Bonn: Federal Agency for Civic Education, 1995.

Fischer World Almanac 1997 Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1996. Fischer World Almanac 2001 Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2000.

Weggel, Oskar. History of China in the 20th Century. Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1989.

8.2. Secondary literature

Bonwetsch, Bernd, and Peter M. Kuhfus. "The Soviet Union, China and the Korean War."Quarterly issues on contemporary history 1 (1985): 28-87.

Gupta, Karunakar. "How did the Korean War begin?" The China Quarterly 52 (1972): 699- 716.

Loth, Wilfried. The Division of the World: History of the Cold War 1941-1955. dtvWorld history of the 20th century. Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1980.

Boesch, Joseph, and Rudolf Schläpfer. World history 2: From the Congress of Vienna to the present. Zurich: Orell Füssli Verlag, 1997.

Rosary, Paul. Paths to the present. Lucerne: Verlag Maihof, 1991. Rink, Steffen. Keyword China. Munich: Wilhelm Heyne Verlag, 1994.

Moltmann, Günter, and Wolfgang Lindig. USA Ploetz: History of the United States for reference. Freiburg im Breisgau: Ploetz published by Herder, 1998.

Dippel, Horst. USA history. Beck's series 2051. Munich: C.H. Beck`sche Verlagsbuchhandlung (Oscar Beck), 1996.

Maull, Hanns. Korea. Beck`s row 812. Munich: C.H. Beck`sche Verlagsbuchhandlung (Oscar Beck), 1987.

Children, Hermann, and Werner Hilgemann. dtv Atlas World History: Volume 2: From the French Revolution to the Present. Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 31st edition, 1997. 1st edition 1966.

Benz, Wolfgang, and Hermann Graml. Weltbild Weltgeschichte: Volume 36: World Problems Between the Power Blocks: The Twentieth Century III. Frankfurt am Main :, Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, licensed edition for Weltbild Verlag GmbH, Augsburg 1998.

Nelson, Frederick M. Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia. 1945, repr. New York 1967.

Kim, Ki-hyuk. The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order: Korea, Japan and the Chinese Empire 1860-1882. Berkeley / Cal., 1980.

Lee, Ki-baik. A New History of Korea. Cambrigde / Mass., 1984.

Fairbank, John K. History of Modern China 1800-1985. Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1989.

Franz-Willing, Georg . China's Recent History 1840 to the Present. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1975.

Rodzinski, Witold. China The Middle Kingdom and its history. Herford: Busse Seewald, 1987.

Opitz, Peter J. China / People's Republic of China since 1945. China: history, problems, prospects. Freiburg / Würzburg: Verlag Ploetz, 1981.

Li, Zhisui. I was Mao's personal doctor. Bergisch Gladbach: Gustav Lübbe Verlag, 1994 Fischer World Almanac 1998. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1997. Fischer World Almanac 1999. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1998. Fischer World Almanac 2000. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1999.

8.3. Sources from the internet October 28, 2000 October 28, 2000 28. October 2000

Klay, Dieter. New documents from the archives of the President of Russia:

50 Years of the Korean War 1950-1953: Stalin and Mao Tsetung were deeply entangled. October 28, 2000

9. Glossary